	Case 8:08-cr-00180-DOC Document 92	Filed 10/11/10	Page 1 of 9	Page ID #:277				
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. United States Attorney DENNISE D. WILLETT Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Santa Ana Branch LAWRENCE E. KOLE (Cal. Bar No. 141582) Assistant United States Attorney 411 West Fourth Street, Suite 8000 Santa Ana, California 92701 Telephone: (714) 338-3594 Facsimile: (714) 338-3564 Email: larry.kole@usdoj.gov							
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America							
9 LO L1 L2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SOUTHERN DIVISION							
L3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)	Case No. SA	A CR 08-180	D-DOC				
L4 L5)	STIPULATION TRIAL DATE 8:30 A.M. A	TO APRIL 2	26, 2011 AT				
L6 L7	PRIORE, and IRENE PEMKOVA,)	New Trial I Proposed Ne Place: Cou Honorable I	ew Time: 8 artroom of	:30 a.m. the				
L8 L9))							
2.0	Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its							

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, the United States Attorney for the Central District of California, and defendants, Moses Onciu, by and through his counsel of record, Gerald Werksman, Beata Gizella Priore, by and through her counsel of record, Joel Levine, and Irene Pemkova, by and through her counsel of record, Diane Bass, stipulate as follows.

Defendants Onciu and Priore first appeared before a
 judicial officer in the court in which this charge is pending on

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August 4, 2008. The Indictment in this case was filed on July 2, 1 2 2008. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., originally required that the trial as to defendants Onciu and 3 Priore commence on or before October 13, 2008. Defendant Pemkova 4 first appeared before a judicial officer in the court in which 5 this charge is pending on August 18, 2008. The Speedy Trial Act 6 of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., originally required that the 7 trial as to defendant Pemkova commence on or before October 27, 8 2008. 9

2. On August 4, 2008, defendants Onciu and Priore were
 arraigned on the Indictment and the Court set a trial date of
 September 30, 2008. On August 18, 2008, defendant Pemkova was
 arraigned on the Indictment and the Court set the same trial date
 of September 30, 2008.

3. Defendants are released on bond pending trial. The
parties estimate that the government's case-in-chief in the trial
of this matter will last approximately 6 days.

4. The Court has previously continued the trial date in
this case from September 30, 2008 to November 2, 2010 upon the
parties' stipulation, and found the interim period to be excluded
in computing the time within which the trial must commence,
pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act.

5. By this stipulation, the parties jointly move to
continue the trial date from November 2, 2010 to April 26, 2011
at 8:30 a.m.

26 6. The parties request the continuance based upon the
27 following facts, which the parties believe demonstrate good cause
28 to support the appropriate findings under the Speedy Trial Act:

Pursuant to defendants' requests, the government 1 a) 2 produced to defendants approximately 500 pages of discovery including search warrants and a written affidavit, voluminous 3 email messages and attachments, memoranda of interviews, 4 investigative reports, criminal history printouts, IP address 5 printouts, and other documentation. In addition, the government 6 produced to defendants many hours of audio recordings of dozens 7 of telephone conversations and an in-person meeting, had these 8 recordings transcribed, and produced to defendants draft 9 transcripts of these recordings, which encompassed over 400 10 Subsequently, the government located additional portions 11 pages. of some of these audio recordings that were incomplete at the 12 13 time of the original production, had those portions transcribed, and produced to defendants the additional portions of the 14 recordings and draft transcripts of these recordings. 15

A medical problem with the wife of defendant 16 b) 17 Priore's counsel has unexpectedly arisen and, as a result, defendant Priore's counsel anticipates that he will not be 18 available for trial in this case as currently scheduled and that 19 he will need additional time to prepare for the trial. 20 Accordingly, defendant Priore's counsel represents that failure 21 to grant the continuance will deny defendant Priore continuity of 22 counsel and adequate representation. 23

c) If a continuance is granted based on the situation
of defendant Priore's counsel, defendant Pemkova's counsel has
federal narcotics trials scheduled on January 18, 2011 and
February 22, 2011, and has an investment fraud trial scheduled in
this court on March 29, 2011 and, as a result, is unavailable to

1 try this case on a new date that will accommodate the situation 2 of defendant Priore's counsel and that is earlier than that 3 stipulated to herein. Accordingly, defendant Pemkova's counsel 4 represents that failure to grant the continuance will deny 5 defendant Pemkova continuity of counsel and adequate 6 representation.

Counsel for defendants represent that additional 7 C) time is necessary to confer with defendants, conduct and complete 8 an independent investigation of the case, conduct and complete 9 additional legal research including for potential pre-trial 10 motions, review the discovery and potential evidence in the case, 11 including that produced by the government, to obtain additional 12 13 discovery that defendants may seek from the government, to review that additional discovery after it is produced, and prepare for 14 trial. Defense counsel represent that failure to grant the 15 continuance would deny them reasonable time necessary for 16 effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due 17 diligence. 18

d) Defendants' counsel have discussed this
stipulation with defendants and defendants consent to the
requested continuance. The government does not object to the
continuance.

7. For purposes of computing the date under the Speedy Trial Act by which defendants' trial must commence, the parties agree that the time period of November 2, 2010 to April 26, 2011, inclusive, should be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (h)(7)(B)(i), and (B)(iv) because the delay results from a continuance granted by the court at defendants'

request, without government objection, on the basis of the 1 2 court's finding that: (i) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and 3 defendants in a speedy trial; (ii) failure to grant the 4 continuance would be likely to make a continuation of the 5 proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice, 6 that it is unreasonable to expect preparation for pre-trial 7 proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits 8 established by the Speedy Trial Act; (iii) failure to grant the 9 continuance would deny defense counsel the reasonable time 10 necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the 11 exercise of due diligence; and (iv) failure to grant the 12 13 continuance would unreasonably deny defendants continuity of counsel and would deny defense counsel the reasonable time 14 necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the 15 exercise of due diligence. 16

17 8. In addition, the parties agree that the time period of 18 November 2, 2010 to April 26, 2011, inclusive, should be excluded 19 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6), because it is a reasonable 20 period of delay resulting from defendants' joinder for trial with 21 each other, the time for trial of defendants has not run, and no 22 motion for severance has been granted.

9. Nothing in this stipulation shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods be excluded from the period within which trial must commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize / / /

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1	the exclusion of additional time periods from the period within					
2	which trial must commence.					
3	IT IS SO STIPULATED.					
4	Dated: October 8, 2010. ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR.					
5	United States Attorney					
6	DENNISE D. WILLETT Assistant United States Attorney					
7	Chief, Santa Ana Branch					
8	/S/ LAWRENCE E. KOLE					
9	Assistant United States Attorney					
10	Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America					
11	I am Moses Onciu's attorney. I have carefully discussed					
12	this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date with my					
13	client. I have fully informed my client of his Speedy Trial rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those rights. I believe that my client's decision to give up the right to be brought to trial earlier than April 26, 2011 is an informed and					
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15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						
21	GERALD WERKSMAN					
22	Attorney for Defendant Moses Onciu					
23						
24	I am Beata Gizella Priore's attorney. I have carefully					
25	discussed this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date					
26	with my client. I have fully informed my client of her Speedy					
27	Trial rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those					
28	rights. I believe that my client's decision to give up the right					
	6					

1 the exclusion of additional time periods from the period					
which trial must commence. IT is so stipulated.					
					Dated: October, 2010.
	DENNISE D. WILLETT Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Santa Ana Branch				
	LAWRENCE E. KOLE Assistant United States Attorney				
	Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America				
I am Moses Onclu's actorney. I have carefully discussed					
this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date with my					
client. I have fully informed my client of his Speedy Trial					
14 rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those right 15 believe that my client's decision to give up the right co) 16 brought to trial earlier than April 26, 2011 is an informed 17					
			voluntary one.		
			Dated: October, 2010.		
	All Wel				
	GERALD WERKSMAN.				
	Attorney for Defendant Moses Onciu				
I am Beata Gizella P	riore's attorney. I have carefully				
5 discussed this stipulation and the continuance of the tr					
with my client. I have fu	lly informed my client of her Speedy				
Trial rights. To my know	ledge, my client understands those				
	y client's decision to give up the right				

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1	to be brought to trial earlier than April 26, 2011 is an informed				
2	and voluntary one.				
3	Dated: October 🏋, 2010.				
4					
5					
6	JOEL LEVINE				
7	Attorney for Defendant Beata Gizella Priore				
8	Beata Gilleria Frieze				
9	I am Irene Pemkova's attorney. I have carefully discussed				
10	this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date with my				
11	client. I have fully informed my client of her Speedy Trial				
12	rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those rights. I				
13	believe that my client's decision to give up the right to be				
14	brought to trial earlier than April 26, 2011 is an informed and				
15	voluntary one.				
16	Dated: October, 2010.				
17					
17 18					
	DIANE BASS				
18 19 20					
18 19 20 21	DIANE BASS Attorney for Defendant				
18 19 20 21 22	DIANE BASS Attorney for Defendant				
18 19 20 21 22 23	DIANE BASS Attorney for Defendant				
18 19 20 21 22 23 24	DIANE BASS Attorney for Defendant				
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	DIANE BASS Attorney for Defendant				
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	DIANE BASS Attorney for Defendant				
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	DIANE BASS Attorney for Defendant				
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	DIANE BASS Attorney for Defendant				

1	to be brought to trial earlier than April 26, 2011 is an informed					
2	and voluntary one.					
3	Dated: October, 2010.					
4						
5						
6	JOEL LEVINE					
7	Attorney for Defendant Beata Gizella Priore					
8						
9	I am Irene Pemkova's attorney. I have carefully discussed					
10	this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date with my					
11	client. I have fully informed my client of her Speedy Trial					
12	rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those rights. I					
13	believe that my client's decision to give up the right to be					
14	brought to trial earlier than April 26, 2011 is an informed and					
15						
16	Dated: October 💆, 2010.					
17	(· N					
18	DIANE BASS					
19						
20	Attorney for Defendant Irene Pemkova					
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1	ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. United States Attorney							
2	2 DENNISE D. WILLETT Assistant United States Attorney							
3	B Chief, Santa Ana Branch LAWRENCE E. KOLE (Cal. Bar No. 141582) A Assistant United States Attorney							
4								
5	Telephone: (714) 338-3594							
6								
7								
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America							
9								
10	UNITED STATES							
11	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA							
	SOUTHERN DIVISION							
12	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)	Case No. SA	CR 08-180	-DOC				
13)							
14	Plaintiff,)	[PROPOSED] (TRIAL DATE)						
15	v.)	8:30 A.M. AI						
16	MOSES ONCIU, BEATA GIZELLA) PRIORE, and IRENE PEMKOVA,)) EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIOD UNDER) SPEEDY TRIAL ACT)						
17) Defendants.)							
18								

The Court has read and considered the Stipulation re Excludable Time Period under Speedy Trial Act filed by the parties in this matter on October 11, 2010. The Court hereby finds that the Stipulation, which this Court incorporates by reference into this Order, demonstrates facts that provide good cause for a finding of excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161.

The Court further finds that: (1) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a speedy trial; (2) failure to grant the continuance

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would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding 1 2 impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; (3) failure to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny defendants 3 continuity of counsel and would deny defense counsel the 4 reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 5 account the exercise of due diligence, and (4) this continuance 6 is a reasonable period of delay resulting from defendants' 7 joinder with each other for trial, the time for trial of 8 defendants has not run, and no motion for severance has been 9 granted. 10

THEREFORE, FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The trial in this matter is continued from November 2,
 2010 to April 26, 2011 at 8:30 a.m.

14 2. The time period of November 2, 2010 to April 26, 2011, 15 inclusive, is excluded in computing the time within which the 16 trial must commence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(6), 17 (h)(7)(A), (h)(7)(B)(I), and (B)(iv).

3. Nothing in this Order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excluded from the period within which trial must commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize the exclusion of additional time periods from the period within which trial must commence.

25 Dated:

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Honorable David O. Carter United States District Judge